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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Communist China: Who's Running the Show?

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21 June 1971
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 June 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist China: Who's Running the Show?

Introduction

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which erupted in the spring of 1966, has had a profound impact on the shape and effectiveness of the nation's leadership hierarchies. Even though a process of restoring some semblance of "normalcy" to China's post-revolutionary power structure has been under way for more than two years, it is still too soon to answer definitively the question of "who's running the show" at the national level. Indeed, there is still a serious problem in assessing the shape and perhaps the function of Communist China's ruling body, the politburo of the Communist Party. The new body--formed at the ninth party congress in April 1969--is a peculiar creation compared to its predecessor. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the politburo consisted of party chairman Mao Tse-tung and a number of top officials in the regime, each of whom had a special constituency that he monitored on behalf of the party. Thus, one man's primary duty was agriculture; one concerned himself with economic affairs; one with foreign affairs; another with party business; yet another with military matters and so forth. The new politburo does not appear to be constructed along such lines. Below the top triumvirate of Mao, his heir-designate Defense Minister Lin Biao, and Premier Chou En-lai--who wears many hats both domestic and foreign--only economic specialist Li Hsien-nien has a clearly identifiable constituency. For the remainder, there is no sharp breakdown of responsibilities, and even the army leaders on the politburo must now be presumed to be heavily involved in other than strictly military affairs. About all that can safely be said

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about the politburo is that most members, although by no means all, probably participate in setting the broad outline of policy direction.

In any case, the politburo itself represents only the tip of a large iceberg. The implementation of the policies that it helps formulate rests in the hands of a still emerging and as yet little known bureaucracy of second- and third-echelon leaders. This memorandum is an attempt to identify these secondary officials and to describe how they fit into the central ruling hierarchy. Unfortunately, there are still many gaps in our knowledge about the structure of China's internal governing mechanism. The Cultural Revolution not only resulted in a sweeping purge of Mao's principal opponents within the top leadership, but also raised havoc throughout the old party and government organizational structure. Although the process of putting together the pieces of this apparatus has been under way since at least the ninth party congress in April 1969, progress has been slow, in part because both the party and government bureaucracies are being restructured and streamlined, and in part because many key personnel appointments apparently have been bones of contention in Peking.

One of the primary objectives of the Cultural Revolution was to bring new blood into the ruling hierarchy.

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Hopefully, a more definitive assessment of at least the central government hierarchy will be possible after the regime holds its Fourth National Peoples Congress which, among other things, is expected to serve as a forum for presenting the full slate of post - Cultural Revolution ministerial appointments. There have been reports that Peking intends to hold this congress sometime this year, but this is unlikely until some of the political maneuvering currently under way within the ruling politburo subsides.

In examining the state of the nation's leadership to date, this paper will focus on the three

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major vertical hierarchies in Peking: the central government, the party, and the military. In each of these areas, we will attempt not only to provide a comprehensive listing of known officials but also to point out, where possible, the division of labor within these vertical hierarchies and their relationship to one another. The fourth section will examine in detail the makeup of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, about which much more information is available. The final section will take up the distaff side of the house, with special emphasis on identifying the wives of the major party and government leaders.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SECTION I: THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The primary target of the Cultural Revolution was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) apparatus, but because the party and government hierarchies formed interlocking directorates with many veteran party leaders concurrently holding top government posts, it was inevitable that the purge would spill over into the central government. Premier Chou En-lai put up a spirited defense of many of his subordinates, and, indeed, he was successful in saving more than a few from total political eclipse. Even so, well over half of his government ministers lost their positions within the first few months of Red Guard terror.

From the wreckage of the Cultural Revolution the regime is trying to erect a new, streamlined bureaucracy--a move specifically directed by Mao Tse-tung on the grounds that the pre - Cultural Revolution structure had become an entrenched elite operating through a chain of command that was unresponsive to the "revolutionary masses" and that was in practice modifying Mao's programs and operating largely outside his personal control. Nevertheless, the process is intended to do more than satisfy Mao's anti-bureaucratic bias. It is also apparently designed to achieve a more clear-cut division of labor between local and national levels in which more responsibility for day-to-day affairs (education, health, production for local use, etc.) devolves upon the lower levels. The number of ministries, according to Chou En-lai, is being reduced by half, and many cadres have been sent off for labor "re-education" either permanently or on rotation. Numerous unidentified new names are now appearing in lists of departments under the State Council. Some pre - Cultural Revolution officials have managed to hang on to their old or similar slots, however, and during the past few months a number of long-absent veteran officials have again appeared.

Two major features about the staffing of the central state bureaucracy are immediately apparent. The first is the unusually heavy representation of the military. In many ministries control presumably is still in the hands of the military control committees that assumed supervision during the Cultural Revolution, and four of the six new ministers who

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have been named thus far are military careerists. These are men in their forties and early fifties who, under the old system, would have had to wait ten to 15 years to acquire comparable positions of authority within the top-heavy military bureaucracy. Judging from what has been observed about the new minister of foreign trade, for example, these new soldier-administrators are intelligent, capable, and articulate, but they almost certainly have to rely on their largely civilian vice ministers for technical expertise.

Although it seems safe to assume that not a single government unit will be free of some form of military influence, it is also interesting to note the return of many veteran cadre to their former places of work. Some are being identified by their former titles; others have shifted from one ministry to another as part of the government reorganization; and still others are listed only as "responsible persons" of various unidentified departments. Their return to duty is ample testimony to Peking's recognition that it cannot cavalierly drain the relatively small reservoir of civilian managerial and technical talent available to China. It also marks a considerable mellowing in the regime's political attitude, which must be particularly shocking to the various revolutionary activistists who only three or four years ago were being exhorted to struggle against the "bureaucrats" and forcibly remove them from office.

The following organizational presentation represents only the key elements of what is known about the central government hierarchy.

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STATE COUNCIL

Premier

Chou En-lai

Chou appears to be "running the country"; at one time he was assisted by 15 vice premiers.

Vice Premiers

Li Hsien-nien

Li, longtime minister of finance, is currently the only working vice premier; like Chou, he is extremely active; his basic field is finance and trade, but he is undoubtedly now performing a much more general economic and planning role.

Li Fu-chun

Once China's top economic specialist, Li appears only irregularly now, and he may be in poor health. His influence is felt primarily through the State Planning Commission, with which he may still be associated.

Hsieh Fu-chih

Hsieh, who is also boss of Peking city and minister of public security, had been out of sight for nearly 15 months until he reappeared in June 1971. At that time he was reidentified as vice premier, but it is not clear whether he still retains the public security portfolio.

Central Ministries
(listed alphabetically)

Note: Formerly there were 40 government ministries and 12 special commissions; as a result of the government reorganization which is still

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under way, the number of governmental units has been drastically cut; this list includes only those ministries that are known to still exist; the regime is apparently now treating the commissions as ministries.

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
(Formed by the merger of the ministries
of Agriculture and Forestry)

Minister

Sha Feng

A military man who was serving as a staff officer in the Armored Corps in 1965.

Vice Ministers

Li Shu-jung

A military man of obscure origins.

Liang Chang-wu

Former vice minister of the Ministry of Forestry.

Yang Li-kung

Former vice minister of the ministry responsible for agricultural machinery, an element of which may have been transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry during the reorganization.

MINISTRY OF BUILDING MATERIALS

Minister

Lai Chi-fa

Lai, minister since March 1965, is one of only three ministers who retained their positions throughout the Cultural Revolution.



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Vice Minister

Pai Hsiang-yin

Pai has been a vice minister since 1965, but his activities went unreported for three years during the Cultural Revolution.

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

(May have absorbed Ministry of Food)

Minister

Position vacant

Vice Minister

Kao Hsiu

Kao has been vice minister since 1964.

MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS

(Absorbed the Ministry of Railways)

Minister

Wang Chieh

A military man who served in the Armored Corps in the late 1950s.

Vice Minister

Tao Chi

Tao has been a vice minister since 1964, but he was out of public view during most of the Cultural Revolution.

Kuo Lu

Kuo is a former vice minister of the Ministry of Railways.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE

Minister

Li Hsien-nien

Li, a politburo member and Chou's only active vice

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premier, has been minister of finance since 1954; none of his vice ministers has been identified since the Cultural Revolution.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFIARS
(See Section IV)

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE

Minister

Pai Hsiang-kuo

A military man, Pai has received considerable exposure since he was named minister in December 1970. He has been described as alert and intelligent; he shows no signs of any specialized knowledge on trade matters but is "quite diplomatic."

Vice Ministers

Li Chiang

Li, a vice minister since 1952, was elevated to the party central committee in 1969; he provides the expertise.

Lin Hai-yun

Lin was named "acting" minister in 1967 following the death of minister Yeh Chi-chiang, but Lin was evidently obliged to give way to the younger soldier-administrator Pai Hsiang-kuo.

Chou Hua-min

Chou, a vice minister since 1964, has recently made several trips abroad as part of the regime's effort to reassert its role in the international community.

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MINISTRY OF FUEL AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
(Formed by the merger of the three industrial
ministries--Chemical, Coal, and Petroleum)

Minister

Position vacant

Vice Minister

Sun Hsiao-feng

Sun is a former vice minister
of Petroleum

Hsu Chin-chiang

Ditto

MINISTRY OF LIGHT INDUSTRY
(Formed by the merger of the First and
Second Ministries of Light Industry with
the Ministry of Textile Industry)

Minister

Chien Chih-kuang

Chien, a former vice minister
of textiles, has the distinc-
tion of being the first civ-
ilian minister confirmed since
the Cultural Revolution; he is
also a member of the party
central committee.

Vice Ministers

Hsieh Hsin-ho

Hsieh is a former deputy of
the Second Ministry of Light
Industry.

Chen Wei-chi

Chen is a former vice minister
of textiles.

FIRST MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Absorbed former Eighth Ministry of Machine Building;
now responsible for all civilian machinery plants)

Minister

Li Shui-ching

A military man, Li became
openly identified with an

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ultraleftist figure in Shantung Province during the Cultural Revolution. His record in Shantung would seem to put him at odds with most conservatively oriented military officials, but he evidently has the support of radical forces in Peking.

Vice Ministers

Shen Hung

Shen is a former vice minister of the original First Ministry of Machine Building.

Chou Tsu-chien

Chou was also with the original First Ministry; he was criticized by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

SECOND MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING

(Responsible for China's atomic energy program; probably under direct military control)

Minister

Position vacant

Vice Minister

Liu Wei

Liu was identified as vice minister in the early 1960s; it is not known if he still has this title, but he was named to the new party central committee.

THIRD MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING

(Aircraft industry; directed mainly at military production)

Minister

Position vacant

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Vice Minister

Hsueh Shao-ching

Hsueh, a former air force officer, was vice minister from 1960 to 1965; lately he has been listed with the central military hierarchy, suggesting that this ministry is now under direct military control.

FOURTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Electronics industries)

No officials have been identified for this ministry since the Cultural Revolution.

FIFTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Conventional armaments--tanks, artillery, small arms, ammunition)

Minister

Chiu Chuang-cheng

Chiu, former commander of the Artillery Corps, was named minister when the Fifth Ministry was first set up in 1963; it is not known if he currently holds this title, but he has been making appearances regularly. He is a member of the party central committee. Two former vice ministers have reappeared since the Cultural Revolution, but neither has been identified by title.

SIXTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Shipbuilding)

Minister

Position vacant

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Military Representation

Liu Shih-hsiung

Liu made a highly unusual "special trip" to a shipyard in Shanghai in June 1970 to attend the launching of two ocean-going merchant ships; Liu was identified at the time as "chairman of the military control committee" of the Sixth Ministry. No other army man serving on the central ministries has been identified in this manner in a radio-broadcast.

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SEVENTH MINISTRY OF MACHINE BUILDING
(Missiles)

Minister

Wang Ping-chang

Wang, a former deputy commander of the Air Force, was named head of China's missile production arm when it was first publicly unveiled in 1965. Wang was heavily criticized during the Cultural Revolution for the usual litany of "revisionist" sins, including opposing Mao's thought, suppressing the revolution, and attempting to set up his own independent kingdom in the Seventh Ministry. Despite these criticisms, Wang was named a member of the central committee in April 1969, and, although he has yet to be identified by his official title, the

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pattern of his appearances in Peking suggests he is currently performing at least some of his former ministerial duties.

MINISTRY OF METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY

Minister

Position vacant

Vice Ministers

Lin Tse-sheng Lin, a vice minister since 1959, resurfaced in good standing after remaining out of sight through most of the Cultural Revolution.

Yang Tien-kuei Yang is a former vice minister of the ministry responsible for civilian machinery plants.

Military Representative

Chu Hu-ning Chu's military background is obscure.

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
(See Section III-The Military)

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY

Minister

Hsieh Fu-chih Hsieh, who is also a vice premier, has not been identified by his ministerial title since early in the Cultural Revolution. Hsieh recently reappeared after a prolonged absence from view, but he does not appear to be playing nearly as active a role in regime councils as before.

MINISTRY OF WATER CONSERVANCY AND ELECTRIC POWER

Minister

Vacant

Vice Ministers

Chien Cheng-ying
(female)

Chien, a vice minister since 1952, re-emerged in good standing in May 1970, after being criticized by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

Tu Hsing-yuan

Tu, a vice-minister since the early 1960s, remained out of sight during most of the Cultural Revolution.

Military Representative

Chang Wen-pi

Chang, a military man from the East China province of Anhwei, moved up to Peking in early 1970, reportedly to replace another military man on the ministry's military control committee who was removed from his post for an unspecified reason.

Special Commissions

COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Raised to ministerial level in the last few months)

Minister

Fang I

Before the Cultural Revolution, Fang was known as the

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"chairman" of the commission. The fact that the regime is now referring to him as "minister" suggests the status of the commissions has been upgraded.

Vice Ministers

Hsieh Huai-te

Hsieh has been a leading member of the commission since its formation in 1964.

Han Tsung-cheng

Han, formerly a deputy chief of a bureau under the commission, recently moved up to a vice ministerial slot.

PHYSICAL CULTURE AND SPORTS COMMISSION

This commission recently has returned to the limelight, in part as a result of "pingpong diplomacy." Tsao Cheng, a military man, is the top official thus far identified with the commission. The commission is apparently controlled directly by the PLA General Staff.

STATE CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION

Minister

Position vacant

Vice Minister

Hsieh Pei-i

Hsieh has been a leading official of the commission since it was set up in 1964. He was out of public view during the Cultural Revolution and was not reidentified by title until late last year.

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STATE PLANNING COMMISSION

(There is evidence that the SPC is playing the major role in directing China's economic recovery following the Cultural Revolution. At least three former ministries--Allocation of Materials, Labor, and Geology--have been absorbed by the SPC, thus greatly expanding its over-all planning capabilities. The State Economic Commission (SEC), on the other hand, appears to have been abolished. Before the Cultural Revolution the SPC handled long-range planning while the SEC supervised short-term production plans. Evidently, these functions have now been centralized in the expanded SPC).

Minister

Li Fu-chun

Li, for many years one of the regime's leading economists, was demoted from the politburo at the ninth party congress in April 1969. Although he is advanced in years and makes few appearances, there is some evidence to suggest that he still exercises some influence over this important planning body.

Other responsible persons

Formerly there were a large number of deputies under the SPC, many of whom headed up important functional departments under the central government. Thus far, however, the only person who has been consistently noted in the company of Li Fu-chun during his infrequent appearances is Su Ching, a military man who is reported to head up the military control committee assigned to the SPC. Su's military background is obscure, but he may have served with the General Staff Department of the PLA.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMMISSION

The existence of this commission was first made public in 1966. It may be responsible for the overall direction of China's advanced weapons program. The civilian aspect of China's R&D program appears now to be controlled by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which reportedly has absorbed the former State Scientific and Technological Commission.

No officials have been identified with this commission in recent years, and, in fact, the regime rarely mentions it. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that the NDSTC or some successor organization must be supervising China's continued efforts in the missile and nuclear field.

OTHER CENTRAL ORGANS AND SPECIAL AGENCIES

THE SUPREME'S PEOPLE'S COURT

During the Cultural Revolution, normal judicial proceedings were suspended and most serious cases were handled by military tribunals. According to the new draft state constitution, the stipulation that the People's Court be "independent, subject only to the law," is omitted, thus bringing the judiciary formally under party control. Even though the courts have lost their separate status, however, the regime is still identifying officials at the national level. These include Chen Chi-han, and Wu Te-feng--two longtime vice presidents of the SPC--Chen Pai, and Yang Lin.

25X1 [redacted] they may be examples of the so-called "revolutionary masses," students and other youthful political activists who came into prominence during the Cultural Revolution.

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THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE

The draft state constitution makes no provision for the appointment of a chief procurator and does not give details of the organization and duties of the

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procuratorate, stating simply that "procuratorial authority is exercised by public security organs at all levels." Nevertheless, the SPP is known still to exist because it was referred to by name in a Peking broadcast announcing the death of Huang Huo-hsing, a deputy Procurator General. Chang Ting-cheng, who was the chief procurator at the start of the Cultural Revolution, is a member of the party central committee, but he has appeared only on major ceremonial occasions in the past two years.

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY

NCNA officially is a special agency under the State Council but in practice operates directly as a propaganda arm of the party.

Director

Position vacant

Deputy Director

Shih Shao-hua

Shih is the only deputy director to emerge apparently unscathed from the Cultural Revolution. He may have close ties with leftist leaders on the politburo.

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Military Representative

Chang Chi-chih



CIVIL AVIATION GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

The CAGA is a special agency of the State Council charged with supervising China's modest civilian airline. The CAGA will undoubtedly come into more prominence as China seeks to expand its international airlines.

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Director

Kuang Jen-nung

Kuang, who has headed the CAGA since 1955, is also a deputy commander of the PLA Air Force. Needless to say, his latter role greatly simplified the institution of military control in 1967; Kuang merely put his uniform back on.

FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE PROMOTION GROUPS

There are numerous associations and special groups that have begun to re-emerge in recent months as China has moved toward resuming a more normal diplomatic role in the world community. Frequently the titles of these organizations are virtually the same as their pre-Cultural Revolution counterparts and, more often than not, the same people are staffing them. However, these persons are largely functionaries, the meeters-and-greeters, who make the preliminary contacts that must proceed more substantive discussions. They, therefore, fall outside the scope of this inquiry.

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SECTION II. THE PARTY HIERARCHY

The apex of any Communist party system is the politburo. Membership is ordinarily kept rather limited, and the Chinese politburo is no exception. However, beneath the politburo there exists a large central bureaucracy of departments, units, and committees that are essentially structured to mirror the government and society that the party controls. In Communist China, before the Cultural Revolution, the party's Secretariat served as the executive arm of the politburo. It controlled the day-to-day activities of ten or so operational departments or units that, in turn, supervised almost every aspect of the party's function and duties.

The leaders of the Cultural Revolution claim that Mao's opponents thwarted his will by seizing control of the party apparatus. It is not surprising therefore, that the head of the Secretariat and the chiefs of each of the subordinate departments were among the first victims of the Cultural Revolution. To date, the Secretariat has not reappeared, and there is no provision for it in the new party constitution; about all that can be said is that responsibility for party reconstruction and organization now is probably divided among a number of politburo members, of whom Chou En-lai appears to be the key figure. Moreover, the regime is being very deliberate about the pace of reconstruction, which is presumably an area of considerable sensitivity in Peking. Of the ten or so original departments and units, only two have been publicly identified as still in existence. The International Liaison Department (ILD), which is responsible for relations with foreign Communist parties, has been particularly active in recent months, following the naming of Keng Piao, China's former ambassador to Albania, as the new director. The ILD is roughly the party equivalent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its relatively rapid re-emergence can be likened to that of the Foreign Ministry within the central ministries.

For the most part, however, the regime is being extremely secretive about who holds what top party jobs. For example, not one member of the politburo

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has been identified in a specific party post, even though it can be presumed that there is some kind of division of labor among the active politburo members. Moreover, analysis of the lists of central party and government figures that attend the major rallies in Peking clearly reveals that the central party hierarchy is as big and cumbersome as that of the central government ministries, despite Mao's efforts to streamline all levels of administrations.

Nevertheless, it is possible to make a few generalizations about the staffing procedures for the party. It is obvious that the military are well represented not only at the politburo level, but also at the working level within the central party hierarchy. It is also evident that, when compared to the ministries, only a small number of party cadre have been reinstated in positions of authority. Conversely, the large numbers of persons appearing in the party listings [redacted]

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[redacted] suggest that many more activists are being brought into the party system.

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In any event, it is likely to be many years before the sort of personal data on these new party cadre that existed on the old party veterans can be accumulated. At the end of this section is a list of names of Chinese officials who appear destined to assume major party responsibilities in the years ahead. Most of these persons appear only on major ceremonial occasions, but a few of them are beginning to attend certain diplomatic functions. [redacted]

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INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT


(The ILD is the party organ responsible for the conduct of relations with "fraternal Communist parties," for the study of the policies, personalities, doctrines, and activities of all Communist parties, and for the identification and encouragement of pro-Chinese groups within those parties.)

Director

Keng Piao

Keng is one of the regime's senior diplomats. Except for a brief interlude during the Cultural Revolution, Keng has served as ambassador to various foreign countries nearly continuously since 1950, his last assignment being China's lone ally in East Europe--Albania. He has also served as a vice minister of foreign affairs, specializing on Southeast Asia, Pakistan, and Nepal.


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Other Responsible
Persons

Shen Chien

Shen, 

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ranks just below Keng Piao and may be a rival of Keng.

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Tang Ming-chao

Tang handles relations with so-called "capitalist" nations, i.e., the West.

Chang Hsiang-shan

Chang is one of the chief administrators of the ILD.

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SECTION III: THE MILITARY HIERARCHY

Organizationally speaking, the Cultural Revolution did not seriously harm the central military structure. Perhaps the biggest casualty was the General Political Department, which dropped out of the news for about two years following the disastrous summer of 1967. Evidently, the leaders of the GPD became directly implicated in the short-lived campaign to "drag out" the handful of revisionists in the military establishment or the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as it is known in China.

Actually, there was a major purge of army personnel at the center in late 1966, but it went largely unnoticed because of the rapid flow of events following the movement of the Cultural Revolution into the provinces in a major way in 1967. Although estimates vary, depending on how one defines a military versus a party leader, something in the order of about one third of China's top military brass was removed at that time. There followed the purge of the GPD in mid-1967 and the mysterious Yang Cheng-wu affair in March 1968, in which three key military officers were sacked following an alleged plot to topple Mao.

[redacted] there were serious differences within China's military elite over a wide range of defense policies [redacted]

[redacted] Given the close relationship between the party and army in China, however, it is obvious that the key decision-making power rests with the prestigious Military Affairs Committee, a party organ under the central committee but probably directly responsive to the politburo and its standing committee headed by Mao and Lin. The MAC probably sets the basic guidelines within which the military hierarchy operates. [redacted]

[redacted] from what is known about its membership it is evident that both the younger, more professionally oriented officers and the old, senior marshals have a share in the decision-making process.


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The implementation of purely military policy--such as national defense planning, the conduct of troop movements, training, logistics, etc.--is probably handled by the General Staff Department under the over-all supervision of the Minister of National Defense, Lin Piao. The head of the PLA General Staff Department, Huang Yung-sheng, is roughly the counterpart of the Chief of the General Staff in the West. There is no separate staff headquarters for the ground forces, and the chief of staff, as the situation exists today, has as his deputies the leaders of the air force and navy as well as the logistics chief. The only person who does not formally come under the chief of staff is the director of the General Political Department. He probably answers directly to the MAC.

The third major element within the military hierarchy is the so-called "administrative unit" of the MAC. This is a special body that apparently was set up under the MAC to supervise the army's growing role in civil affairs as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

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The importance of this body can be seen in the high party ranking that was ultimately accorded its top leadership. Five of its seven members were elevated to the politburo at the ninth party congress in 1969. If the administrative unit is, in fact, the primary organ overseeing the army's performance of its many civil duties, then it is truly a powerful group. The military men who were placed in control of the central and provincial government machinery during the Cultural Revolution are now being awarded equivalent positions of authority in the rebuilt party structure. Thus, the leaders of the administrative unit are in a position to exercise the major influence over the future makeup and direction of the party itself. In effect, the levers of political control in China today are more highly centralized than ever before.

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THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Minister

Lin Piao

Lin has held this post since 1959, when he replaced Peng Te-huai, a strong representative of professional interests within the military who openly challenged Mao's authority. In his role as defense minister, Lin usually restricts his visible activities to signing anniversary greetings to other Communist countries.

Vice Ministers

Hsiao Ching-kuang


Hsiao is also commander of the PLA navy. He appears to play primarily a ceremonial role.

Wang Shu-sheng

Wang, along with Su Yu (see below), is believed to play a major role in overseeing the defense-related industries.

Su Yu

Su, a former PLA chief of staff,



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Hsu Shih-yu

Hsu is the commander of the powerful Nanking Military Region in East China. He

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is one of several regional commanders brought into the politburo following the Cultural Revolution. There are indications that he ranks high among the active military leaders on the politburo. References to his position on the MND staff are rare.

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

(The MAC is actually a party organ, but it is included in this section because it is entrusted with the formulation, control, and activation of basic military policy.)

Chairman

Mao Tse-tung

Mao himself probably sits as ex officio chairman at the more important committee sessions.

Vice Chairmen

Lin Piao

Lin is the senior vice chairman and probably chairs routine sessions.

Yeh Chien-ying

Of the four vice chairmen below Lin, Yeh makes the most public appearances.

Nieh Jung-chen

Nieh was once the leading administrator of China's advanced weapons program. He now appears to be politically sidelined; his MAC position may be purely ceremonial.

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Hsu Hsiang-chien Inactive

Chen I
Chen, China's ebulent Foreign Minister, has been politically sidelined, perhaps permanently. His MAC title seems to be purely ceremonial.

Members

Li Te-sheng
Li is also the new director of the General Political Department.

Chang Ta-chih
Chang is also commander of the PLA Artillery Corps.

MAC ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT

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The Administrative Unit is believed to be a special sub-unit of MAC formed to oversee the army's performance of its many civil tasks acquired as a result of the Cultural Revolution.)

Huang Yung-sheng
Huang, by virtue of his positions as Chief of Staff and head of the Administrative Unit, exercises a major influence over both the army's professional and political tasks.

Wen Yu-cheng
Wen, commander of the politically sensitive Peking Garrison, has been out of sight for about a year.

Wu Fa-hsien
Wu is commander of the PLA Air Force.

Li Tso-peng
Li is political commissar of the PLA Navy.

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Chiu Hui-tso	Chiu is director of the General Rear Services Department (Logistics).
Yeh Chun	Lin Piao's wife.
Liu Hsien-chuan	Liu is a regional military figure who supported the leftists in Tsinghai Province.

PLA General Staff

(This department directs the functions and activities of the armed forces as a whole; there is no separate headquarters for the ground forces or the infantry; the head of the General Staff Department is, in effect, the Chief of the General Staff.)

Huang Yung-sheng	Huang, the former commander of the Canton Military Region in south China, was named to this position following the purge of Yang Cheng-wu in 1968. Next to Lin Piao, Huang is clearly the most powerful active military leader in China today.
Wu Fa-hsien	Wu is commander of the PLA Air Force.
Li Tso-peng	Li is political commissar of the PLA Navy.
Chiu Hui-tso	Chiu is director of the General Rear Services Department (Logistics).
Wen Yu-cheng	Wen is also Peking Garrison commander.
Wang Hsin-ting	Wang has been a deputy chief of staff since 1963.
Peng Shao-hui	Peng has been a deputy chief of staff since the mid 1950s.

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Yen Chung-chuan

Yen was named deputy chief of staff in 1969; he is closely associated with Huang Yung-sheng.

Chen Chi-te

Chen was named deputy chief of staff in 1970; he served with a tactical unit in Shantung Province during the Cultural Revolution.

GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

(The GPD is the principal agency within the PLA for carrying out the party's ideological and organizational work in the armed forces; it operates under the direction of the MAC. During the Cultural Revolution, the GPD was temporarily sidelined and its functions were apparently taken over directly by the MAC)

Director

Li Te-sheng

Li, who was a tactical unit commander at the start of the Cultural Revolution, has risen rapidly in the hierarchy. He has, in succession, been named chief of Anhwei Province in East China, an alternate member of the politburo, member of the MAC, and director of the GPD, the army's top political commissar. The last appointment came as somewhat of a surprise; Li has been a commander of troops during most of his PLA career.

Deputy Director

Huang Chih-yung

Huang is political commissar of the Armored Corps.

Tien Wei-hsin

Tien's military background
is obscure.GENERAL REAR SERVICES DEPARTMENT

(The GRS is the highest logistics agency for all the armed forces; in addition to providing over-all guidance for the military's supply efforts, it has become involved in a wide range of civilian transportation matters.)

Director

Chiu Hui-tso

Chiu has been director since 1956; he was named deputy chief of staff in 1969, thus bringing his department formally under the control of the General Staff, headed by Huang Yung-sheng.

Political Commissar

Chang Chih-ming

Chang was moved up from deputy director in 1967.

PLA SERVICES AND BRANCHESPLA AIR FORCECommander

Wu Fa-hsien

Wu, in an unusual move, was transferred from air force political commissar to commander in 1965; as a member of the politburo, Wu exercises the primary political influence in the air force.

Political Commissar

Wang Hui-chiu

Wang, the ranking deputy political commissar, was moved up to replace the controversial Yu Li-chin, marking a return to a more normal promotion pattern in the air force.

PLA NAVYCommander

Hsiao Ching-kuang

The role of Hsiao, who has been commander of the navy since its inception in the early 1950s, appears to be primarily ceremonial.

Political Commissar

Li Tso-peng

Li, a former deputy commander of the navy, was moved up to the top political post in 1967. His position on the politburo makes him the most powerful party figure in the navy.

PLA ARMORED CORPSCommander

Position vacant

Political Commissar

Huang Chih-yung

Huang was recently named deputy director of the General Political Department; it is not clear whether or not he retains his position in the Armored Corps.

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PLA ARTILLERY CORPS

Commander

Chang Ta-chih

Chang, a regional military figure, was named commander in 1969; he has also been identified as a member of the MAC.

Political Commissar

Chen Jen-chi

There is some question about whether or not Chen still holds this post.

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PLA ENGINEERING CORPS

Commander

Chen Shih-chu

Chen has been commander since 1952.

Political Commissar

Li Chen

Li's military background is obscure.

PLA RAILWAY CORPS

Commander

Chang I-hsiang

Chang was named to the post in 1968; previously he was associated with military training.

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Political Commissar

Position vacant

PLA SIGNAL CORPS

Commander

Position vacant

Political Commissar

Huang Wen-ning

Huang has held this post
since 1966.

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SECTION IV: THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

In comparison with other party and governmental institutions in China, the Foreign Ministry is clearly a special case. In the first place, simply because of its functions, the Foreign Ministry receives much more exposure than other governmental units that are oriented primarily toward domestic matters. Moreover, as China has sought to resume more or less normal diplomatic contact since the ninth party congress in 1969, it has necessarily had to move faster in restaffing the various geographic and functional departments of this ministry. As a result, much more is known about how it operates than any of the other governmental units.

Most of the faces showing up in the ministry are familiar ones. In nearly every case, positions in the key geographic departments are going to officials with considerable field experience in their area of responsibility. A similar trend toward professionalism has been evident in the men sent abroad by Peking since mid-1969 to replace the chiefs of missions who were recalled in early 1967 for Cultural Revolution "re-education." As in the case with nearly every governmental unit, there are military representatives within the ministry--some of whom are ranked higher than vice foreign ministers. But none of them has been identified as yet with permanent positions in the ministry. In short, the professionals appear to control the actual operations of the ministry.

Except for a brief period in 1967, the Foreign Ministry was spared much of the political upheaval that afflicted so many other ministries. In April of this year a successor was named to replace former Foreign Minister Chen I, but Premier Chou En-lai still handles most of the major responsibilities of the job. The new minister, ranking deputy minister Chi Peng-fei, is only "acting," however, suggesting that the question of who will ultimately run the show is still being debated.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(The seven geographic departments that existed before the Cultural Revolution have been merged into four as part of the general effort toward streamlining the government.)

Minister


Chi Peng-fei

Chi, the ranking vice minister, was named "acting" minister in April. Since that time he has been playing the role to the hilt. He accompanied various diplomats assigned to Peking on a tour of the provinces organized by the ministry. Chi apparently retains his regional responsibility for African and West Asian affairs.

Vice Minister

Chiao Kuan-hua

Chiao, the vice minister responsible for Soviet and East European affairs, has recently assumed responsibility for relations with the West.



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Han Nien-lung

Han is the vice minister responsible for Asian affairs.

Hsu I-hsin

Hsu is responsible for overall administrative matters in the ministry.

Military Representatives

Li Yao wen

Former regional military official

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Ma Wen-po Background obscure

Chen Te-ho " "

Department of West Europe and American Affairs

Director

Chang Wen-chin

Deputy Director (Americas and Australia)

Ling Ching

Deputy Director (Western Europe)

Tang Hai-kuang

Head of British, Scandinavian and possible Dutch Section

Yu Chun

Head of French, Swiss, and Italian Section

Yu Hui-min

Officer dealing with Britain

Chang I-chun

Officer dealing with Canada

Chu Chui-sheng

Officer dealing with Finland and the Netherlands

Wu-Chung-chun

Officer dealing with Norway, Denmark, and possibly Sweden

Li Pao-cheng

Department of Asian Affairs

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Deputy Directors

Lu Wei-chao
Yang Kung-su
Tsao Ko-chiang

Officer dealing with India and Ceylon

Li Ta-nan

Responsible persons

Jen Hou-kun
Kuo Chien-tsai
Tang Ye-wen
Liu Chun
Wang Chung-li
Yeh Cheng-chang

Department of Soviet and East European Affairs

Director

Yu Chan

Deputy Directors

Li Lien-ching
Li Ting-chuan

Head of Polish Section

Liu Tieh-cheng

Head of Soviet Section

Yu Hun-liang

Officer dealing with Soviet Union

Li Hui-ching

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West Asian and African Affairs Department

Director

Ho Ying

Deputy Director

Ho Kung-kai

Functional Departments:

Protocol Department

Deputy Director

Han Hsu

Responsible person

Wang Hai-jung

Information Department

Director

Chen Chu

Deputy Director

Yuan Lu-lin

Consular Department

Responsible persons

Kuan Tsung-chou

Lin Ching-yu

General Office

Director

Fu Hao

The Cultural Revolution has witnessed the rise of the wives of the regime's two top leaders--Chiang Ching (Madame Mao) and Yeh Chun (Madame Lin). The wives of certain Chinese officials have always held high party positions--such as Premier Chou En-lai's wife Teng Ying-chao, who has been a member of the party central committee for years--but Chiang Ching and Yeh Chun are the first to have been brought into the elite politburo. Although neither one has been identified in a specific party or government post, Chiang Ching continues to be active in the field of cultural affairs, and she may be given a formal position in this field, such as the minister of culture.

The list that follows is by no means an exhaustive study, but it does contain the names of those women who are currently making appearances at various meetings and diplomatic functions in Peking.

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Relationship</u>
Chiang Ching	Wife of Mao Tse-tung
Yeh Chun	Wife of Defense Minister Lin Piao
Teng Ying-chao	Wife of Premier Chou En-lai
Tsao I-ou	Wife of politburo member Kang Sheng
Tsai Chang	Wife of economist Li Fu-chun
Lin Chia-mei	Wife of Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
Liu Hsiang-ping	Wife of politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih
Yu Li-chun	Wife of Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the National People's Congress
Niu Hsin-chen	Wife of deputy air force commander Kuang Jen-nung
Hsu Han-ping	Wife of acting Foreign Min- ister Chi Peng-fei
Wang Hai-jung	Reportedly Mao's niece
Wang Chen	Wife of vice foreign minister Han Nien-lung
Sung Ching-ling	Madame Sun Yat-sen

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